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AUTONOI\1Y9S MAGIC WAND: ABORTION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
ANiTA L. ALLEN*

Constitutional law chan ges, even though the Constitution remains the
sa me. American abortion Jaw aptly ill ustrates this poin t . A lthough the text

of the Fourteenth A mendment has remained constant since the U nited
States Supreme Court decided

Roe v. Wade 1

i n 1973, the Court has altered

its position on the constitutionality of restrictive abortion statutes. Accord
ing to

Roe,

the D ue P rocess Clause prohib i t s governme n t from c riminalizing

early abortions. Yet, recent decisions permit government to restrict abort ion
throughout pregnancy in the i nterest of maternal well-being and u nborn l ife.
Moreover, four J us tices favor overruling

Roe

o ut right . 2

This essay comments o n the changeability o f constitutional l a w and its
in terpretation by the Supreme Court, emphasizing the deterioration of the
Supreme Court doct rine that the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses a
fundamental right of privacy broad enough to include abortion.

A n other

closely related doctrinal shift is the Court's virtual "about face" on the con
stitutionality of abortion restrict ions.
The "about face" began in 1989 with

ices, 3

Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv

a decision upholding restrictive provisions of Missouri's abortion law, 4

and continued in 1992 with

Planned Parenthood v. Casey.5

Casey

tested the

constitutionality of provisions of the Penn s y lvania Abortion Con trol Act
that permitted abortion but subjected patients and their health care provid
ers to controversial consent, notification, and public reporting requiremen ts.6
Specifically, the law required (1) that minors obtain parental consent or a
court order;

(2)

that married women not meeting one of several exceptions

notify their husbands; (3) that all women give ;'informed consent" after
receivin g i nformation discouraging abortion and waiting twenty-four hours;
and
*

(4)

that abortion facilities submit and disclose det ailed public reports7

Professor of Law. Georgewwn

l.iniversity

Law Center. Ph.D. !979. university of

Michigan: J.D. 1984, Harvard Law S..:hool.
1

4 10 U.S. 113 (1973).

2

They are Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White. Scalia, and Thomas.

3

492 liS 490 (!989).

1 Si!e Anita L. Allen. Webster ,\larks Time. 2 BJOL\W

VVcb>·tqr).
5

112 S. Ct. 2791

6

18 P \ Cor.-s. ST-'..T.

7 hi.

(1992)
�§

3 203-3220

( 1990)

1531.

15�3

(1969) (discu�sing

Critics fe:11· that this last requirement will comprom1sc patient anonymity <Jnd

drown abcJrtion providers in rctpenvork.

68.3
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A merican College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 8

an

earlier test of Pennsylvania law, the Court i nvalidated informed consent and
record-keeping statutes similar to those revisited in
a resounding endorsement of

Roe.

Casey. Thornburgh

was

Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun

condemned as unconstitutional state efforts to legislate t i me-consuming,
expensive, and invasive preconditions t o abortion services. 9 U nder

Thorn

a state may neither ban nor restrict abortion by encumbering the

burgh,

decision to abort .
In

Thornburgh,

as in

R oe,

a majority of the Court portrayed the right of

abortion privacy as "fundamental." In effect,

R oe

and

Thornburgh

legislative interference with free choice prima facie invalid.

declared

Most observers

correctly predicted that a reconstituted panel of nine Justices would decide

Casey

differently from the Court's

After

Thornburgh,

Thornburgh

decision just six years earlier.

the number of Justices subscribin g to the jurisprudence

of fundamental abortion rights dwindled. Subjecting strik i n gly similar laws
to strikingly dissimilar analysis, the
holding of

R oe, 10

Casey

majority affirmed the "essential"

but abandoned the presumption that most restrictions o n

abortion are unconstitutional.

Casey

portrayed legislated i mpediments that

do not "unduly burden" the fundamental abortion right as prima facie valid,
even if they make abortion inconvenient and expensiveY The Court stated
that an anti-abortion statute imposes an "undue" burden if it places a sub
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetusY
Reaffirming

R oe

in

Casey,

but abandoning its strict standard of constitu

tional validity, the Court labored to avoid the appearance of constitutional
change.

It elaborated its "obligation to follow precedent"13 and the impro

priety of "reexamining the prior law with[out] any justification beyond a
present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court o f

1973."14

T h e maj ority opinion stressed

R oe's

promise of female liberty. T h e

Court's feminist rhetorical flourishes linked a woman's "unique " reproduc
tive liberty to her ability "to participate equally in the econ omic and social

8

476 U.S. 747 (1986).

9

!d . at 772.

1°

Roe

Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804. The Casey Court referred to the "essential" holding of
as

the recognition of:

the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it
without undue interference from the State ... (,] the State's power to restrict abor
tions after fetal viability, ... [and] the principle that the State has legitimate interests
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life
of the fetus that may become a child.
!d.

11

!d. at 2819.
Id. at 2820.
13 Jd. at 2808-16.

12

14 Id.

at 2813-14.
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life of the Nation"15 in roles she chooses. Declaring the importance of inti
macy and personal life, the Court repudiated categorical abortion bans and
rejected Pennsylvania's regulation requiring spousal notification as unduly
burdensome.16
I n reality, however, the Court' s version of stare decisis open l y announced
a new, weaker standard of review for all abortion cases and employed that
standard to uphold statutes virtually identical t o those it declared unconsti
tutional just a few years ago. The Court upheld the stringent i nformed con
sent/twenty-four hour waiting period.

Moreover,

defining "trimester" analytic framework of

R oe,

Casey

jettisoned the

which prohibited states

from regulating abortion for maternal and fetal well-being until the second
and third trimesters of pregnancy, respective l y .

Roe

As originally interpreted,

may be cited as grounds for severely limiting until the third trimester

state intervention premised on the interest of the unborn.

A l though

Ca sey

prohibited pre-viability blanket bans on abortion, the majority maintained
that states have an assertible interest i n the fetus at all stages of pregnancyY
A s a result,

Casey

departed significantly enough from

vaunted "1egitimacy . "18

Casey

R oe

to lessen its

can b e seen as just the kind of unpri ncipled

politic(lll y opportune decision making made "unnecessarily and under pres
s ure"19 that the majority claimed it wanted to avoid.
S tressing that the

Roe

framework had not proven unworkable, the Court

nevert heless significantly modified the constitutional law set forth in
Justices Blackmun and Stevens voted i n partial dissents i n
the classic version of

R oe.

Casey

R oe .

to preserve

A lthough the conservative block, consisting of

Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas, decided it was time to
rewrite constitutional abortion law, the moderate block, consisting of Jus
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, thought i t was time to reread it.

Hmv did the Court get from Roe and Thornburgh to Casey? How does
constitutional law change even though the Constitution remains the same?
In one sense the move from
prehend.

Roe

and

Thornburgh

to

Casey

is easy to com

With departures from and new appointments to the Court, the

number of Justices willing to defend the right t o choose abortion on funda
m ental privacy grounds shran k .

The Court, viewed as a collective entity.

simpl y changed its mind.
The Court, however, should not change its mind so free l y .

Although it

can be explained as a political shift to the right in the Court's composition,

the t ransition from Thorn burgh to Casey may nevertheless appear inexplica
ble to members of the general public predisposed to view the discipline of
constitutional interpretation as exact, binding, and, once the judge dons the
black robes, apol itical . If constitutional int erpretation were an exact, bind-

1� !d. at
16 I
d at
17 !d. at

2809.
2826-31.
2816.

13 Id
19 Id at 2815.

[Vol.
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mg, and apolit ical discipline, the mere change in learned personnel would
not change the meaning of fundamental Jaw .

We w oul d not go from a

Thornburgh to a Webster in only three years, or from a Roe to a Casey in a
mere twenty.
The disempowered status of the fundamental right to privacy demon
strates that even rights formulated in the sweeping language of fundamental
ity and sanctity,

rights that promise to function as

m agic

wands for

autonomous individuals, are vul nerable to repudiation if new Justices con
clude that earlier ones committed egregious error.

In varying degrees, the

Justices who have j oined the Court since Roe-Scalia, Thomas, Souter, Ken
nedy, and O'Connor-like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White ,
believe that

Roe

contains improper reasoning and that its mistakes may not

stand. There is, however, notorious disagreement about the extent t o which

Roe was erroneous. What I characterize below as "backward-looking'' and
"downward-looking" approaches t o constitutional interpretation20 contrib
uted to the Court's rapid reassessment of

Roe.

Accounting for change in the jurisprudence of abortion rights is an occa
sion for reflecting on the implicit l egal and interpretive philosophies of the
federal judiciary in constitutional opinions.

In the abort i o n field, consti tu

tional law has changed because the composition of the Court has changed

Republican presidents have appointed m ore moderates and conservatives
and fewer liberals . I suggest that, although conservative, liberal, and moder
ate Justices alike employ backward- looking, positivistic rhet o ric to justify
their decisions, the contingent of Justices with aggressively-an d , arguably,
heedlessly-backward-looking
interpretation

has

grown.

substantive
Aggressively

approaches

to

constitutional

backward-looking

s ubstantive

approaches have undercut the jurisprudence of fundamental privacy that
once supported strict judicial protection of abortion rights.

As a result,

\\'Omen seeking abortions face numerous new restrictions and the threat of

ultimate prohibition.
LIBERATING AUTONOMY
Nearly thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided Gris
wold v. ConnecticutY The Griswold Court held that states may not
criminalize a married woman's use of birth control. as Connecticut and
many other states had done since the Comstock Era of the late nineteenth
century."2 The Griswold Court based i t s holding on a generaL fundamental
constitutional ri ght to privacy, announcing for the first t ime the existence of
a discrete, general constitutional right of privacy. Previously. the Court had
:tppeaied to the concept of p ri v ac y occasionaily to justify or ;·eject L:gislative
:J.•l

Sc-u

inji-a

text accompanying notes 57-71.

21 38i U.S . 479
22

(196:5).

DEHOR.·\H L. RHODE, JUSTICE .-\!\:D GENDER

204, 264 (1989) (Irctl'lr1�.

rdanonship between gender and the law in the United States).

the: nohing
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or Jaw enforcement policy.23 Furthermore, early in the century, state courts
had begun recognizing privacy rights expressly in tort law, inspired by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's famous 1890 Harvard Law Review
articl e .24 Warren and Brandeis, however, l i m ited their argument to the state
common l aw of tort s .

Moreover, Justice B randeis's eloquent appeal to t h e

value o f privacy in a dissenting opinion i n an early Supreme Court w iretap
ping case25 fel l short of recognizing an independent constitutional privacy
righ t .
characterized t h e right o f privacy a s "fundamental. "

Griswold

A s l ater

cases woul d explain, "fundamental" right s "qualify for heightened judicial
protection ."26

Fundamental rights are those the Court deems to be either

"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"27 or "implicit in the
concept of ordered l iberty" so that "neither liberty nor j ustice woul d exist if
they were sacrifice d . "28 In enacting legislation affecting a nonfundamental
constitutional right or liberty, state and federal lawmakers may i m pinge
upon that constitutional right or liberty if the legislation is "rationally
related" to the furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest.

By con

trast, designated "fundamental" rights are so strong that govern m e n t must
establish a "compelling" state i n terest in legislation that impairs them.
l·\ccordin gly, the fundamental right to privacy requires courts to invalidate
legislation in volving public interference with private decisionmaking, u nless
strict j udicial scrutiny uncovers a compelling state interest.29
The

Griswold

case appeared to signal that the courts would strictly protect

against laws impinging upon privacy . 30 At first, Justice Douglas's m ajority
opinion explaining the jurisprudence of constitutional privacy caused some
confusion31

23

Olmstead v. United States,

makers of

our

::done-the
2.;

Douglas raised the notion of a totalitarian specter of police

Constitution .

most

277 U.S. 438,478 (1928)

(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The

. conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let

comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.").

Samuel D. \Varren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,

4

HARY. L. REV.

193 (1890).
2';

0/msiead. 277 U.S. at

2li

Bowers

v.

471-85.

Hardwick, 478 U.S 186, 191 (1985) (arguing that consensual sodomy

bet'."een homosexuals is not a fundamental right).
27

iYloore

::s

Palko

v.

v.

City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.

494,

503

( 1977).

C onn.;c tic ut . 302 U.S. 3 1 9 , 3 2 5 , 326 (1937) (finding a state statute allowing

the :;tate to appeal criminal cases to be consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment).
29

dens

Recently. the Court has begun to inquire whether challenged legislation unduly bur
a

constitutional right. When it is deemed not to, strict scrutiny yields to a weaker

standard of review and state action is upheld. See

infra

text accompanying notes 55-56

(discussing parental nOtification cases).
30

But they h ave not. See. e.g.. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 26 1

( 1990)

(upholdi!lg a state requirement that evidence of an "incompetent's wishes as to the

\'.ithdrc;wal of life-sustaining treatment" be clear and convincing).
:JJ

Sec i\nita L. Allen. Taking Liberties: Privacy. Pri;·are Choice. and Social Col/lracr

Theon·. 56 U. CI:--;. L Rt:v.

461.467-68 (1987).

[Vol.
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entering the "sacred" realm of the marital bedroom, checki n g for evidence
of illegal birth control practices. Yet, he was less concerned about invasions
into physical privacy-trespassing typical of Fourth Amendment search and
seizure cases-than invasions into decisional privac y . 32 Douglas presented a
vision of American life in which men and women, consulting medical profes
sionals of their own choosing, would have the legal power to decide for
themselves

certain

important

matters

touching

family

life,

especially

whether and when to have children.
I n the ancient Western world, the Greeks and Romans understood social
life t o i nclude separate public and private realms.33 Matters relating to the
household, women, chi l dren, and servants o r slaves were deem ed-and deni
grated as-private affairs. A l though the value placed on the private sphere
has changed, the cultural assumption of an appropriately private sphere
remains .

Griswold

reflects this value by holding that courts must interpret

our Constitution to include broad protection of what is appropriately consid
ered private life. 34
The ultimate value of decisional privacy rights regard i n g procreation may
be that such rights make us more fit for our social roles i n group life.35

Yet,

the flourishin g of communal life depends largely on the flourishin g of indi
viduals who are morally autonomous and free t o act on their own judg
ments. 36

Moral autonomy connotes the capacity for rational, responsible

self-regulation and self-determination . 37 A society's laws can either promote
or impair moral autonomy so conceived.

I n the nineteenth century, John

Stuan Mill made the classic liberal defense of legal autonomy, arguing in
favor of freedom from governmental interference in the broad domain of
self-regarding conduct , which defense received support from the utilitarian
belief that i ndividuals know themselves and therefore their interests best.38

32 ld.
33 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 (1958) (discussing various
pre-modern views of the public and private realms); see also JDRGEN HABERMAS, THE

STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY I NT O

A

C1\TE·

GORY OF BouRGEOIS SociETY

3-5 (Thomas Burger trans.. The MIT Press 1989) ( 1962)
(discussing the public and private spheres of the Greeks and Romans).

3'" Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86.
35

See ANITA L ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN .\ FREE SOC!·

ETY 51-52 (1988) (analyzing privacy as it relates to women in America).
36 Jd
37 See

generally

IMMANUEL

KANT,

FOUNDATIONS

OF

THE

METAPH'r'SICS

OF

MoR.A.LS AND WH:'\T ls ENLIGHTENMENT

(Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-Mcrrill Educa
tional Publishing 1981) ( 1785) (arguing that human beings possess moral autonomy and
that rational and free beings are properly ascribed moral status and moral responsibility).

38 JOHN STUART MILL, 0:--.: LlBERTY 10-11, 208, 239-46 PASSJM (David Spitz ed.,
Norton 1975) (1859) (asserting the principle that only self-protection warrants society's
control over the individual).
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Liberal philosophers Joel Feinberg,39 Gerald Dworkin,40 and David A .J.
Richards41 maintain that the moral basis for constitutional privacy rights is
that they protect the formation and exercise of moral autonomy.
Moral autonomy has not had an easy life in the hands of the law. As often
as the law has empowered human beings by protecting their morally autono
mous choices, it has subordinated, enslaved, and destroyed them . The

Gris

case might have appeared to be the final legal liberation of m o ral

wold

auton omy in the United States.

Griswold

seemed to place a magic wand

the fundamental right to privacy-in eager hands. The right to privacy was
auto nomy's magic wand, a deft restraint on public regulation of decisions
about health, sex, and procreationY One of the first categories of oppressive
law to go was a vestige of American racism and slaver y : state laws prohibit
ing marriage between men and women of different races43 The ban on i nter
racial m arriage fell under the privacy doctrine, despite strong sentiments,
then and now, that miscegenation is unnatural and ungodly.44

IMPOTENCE AND DEMISE
When

like

Roe

was decided in

a powerful tool indeed .

1973,
U nder

the right to privacy must have seemed

Roe,

women have a privacy right that

allows them to terminate their pregnancies .

They have this right, notwith

standing significant public disapproval .45 That, however, is the nature of a
39 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 47-97 (1986) (exploring the limits imposed on
personal autonomy by the rivalry between criminal law and individual moral autonomy).
40

See generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY

(1988) (developing and applying a new concept of autonomy).
41 See generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 23181 (1986) (advocating and applying an alternative integrated interpretive approach to
constitutional privacy).
42

Anita L. Allen, Court Disables Di�puted Legacy of Privacy Right, Nxr'L L.J., Aug.

13, 1990, at S8 ("The Rehnquist Court is disabling a controversial jurisprudence of fun
damental constitutional privacy that, for a time after

[Griswold]

and

[Roe],

promised to

become autonomy's magic wand-a deft restraint on public regulation of decisions about
public health.").
•13

Loving v. Virginia,

388 U.S. 1 (1967) (unanimou3 decision rendering unconstitu

!ional statutes barring interracial marriages).
4'1

June

David Margolick, A Mixed ;\1arriage's 25th Anniversary of Legaiity. N.Y. TJ>,tES.

12.

1992. at B20 (relating that the sheriff who intruded into the Lovings· bedwom in

i 958 and charged them with unlawful cohabitation still thinks the anti-miscegenation

statute should exist and quoting him as saying:
m ar r y

a

"'I don't t hin k

The Lord made sparrows and

black person.

a

ro bi n s ,

white person should
not to

rmx

w:th

one

another.' ").

45 Of course, public support existed. too. See RHODE. supra

note

22. at 203

(stating

that in the decade before Roe, public approval of abortion for pregn;:mcies resulting from

rare or incest. or in cases of fetal abnormalities or threat to the mother's health, reached

as

high

as

80% to 90%).

Hundreds of thousands of women were already h:1ving abnr

llons each year before Roe.

In

1967, estimates of the numher of abortions performt:d
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One can use it as one wishes, in the independent exercise of

one's own j udgment.
After

R oe,

some feared-and others hoped-that anything was possible,

that Roe had generated momentum down a slippery slope. We m ust tolerate
abortion .

Consequent l y , we must also tolerate obscenity and pornography,

prostitution between consenting adults, marij uana smoking, and homosexual
sodom y .

The right to privacy was a magic wand!

If i t w ere invoked, the

courts would do one's bidding, ridiculous or sublime. "They" would declare
long-haired minors immune from expulsion from public schools ;46 "they"
would prevent doctors from forcibly sustaining the elderly and injured who
persisted in a vegetative state in state hospitals, long after their meaningful
lives had ended.47
The right to privacy, however, has proven less powerf u l than first appear
ances s uggested. The right to privacy-the principle of p u blic toleration of
autonomous, self-regarding choice-was never a magic w a n d .

The magic

wand conception of the right to privacy was a mere ill u s i o n , a fantasy whose
practical l imitations became clear. Prostitution was never decri minalized on
constitutional privacy grounds, even during the

1970's,

when casual sex and

"one-night stands" were commonplace and the risk of exposure to the AIDS
virus did not poison every sexual encounter . 48 In addition, hom osexual sod
omy remain ed unprotected b y the Constitution .

The C o u r t , argui ng that

the right to engage in homosexual acts was not fundamental, u p h e l d a Geor
gia criminal statute under which police arrested a homosex ual after they
entered

his home

and

discovered

him

engaging

in

sodomy.49

Bowers

ranged from as low as two hundred thousand to as high as two million. Harold Rosen, A
Case Study in Social Hypocrisy. in ABORTION IN AMERIC\ 299, 299 (Harold Rosen eel.,

1967) (arguing for the right of women to have abortions and finding hypocrisy in medical
and legal approaches to the issue).
46

Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1974) (declaring unconstitutional that

portion of a high school grooming code that related to boys' hair length). Bu1 see New
Rider v. Board ofEduc., 480 F.2d 693 (lOth Cir. 1973) (holding that a junior high school
rule prohibiting hair length beyond shirt collar did not violate Pawnee Indian students'
guarantees of freedom of speech. free exercise of religion, equal protection. or due
process).
41

Cruzan

v.

Director. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S 261 (1990) (holding that a per

son's liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing medical treatment may
extend to life-sustaining treatment. but that a surrogate exercising this 1·ight for Jn incom
petent person may be limited by the state's interest in protecting and preserving life): In
re

Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (allowing father acting

as

comatose daughter's

guardian to discontinue her life support provided her medical prognosis contained no
chance of a cognitive recovery).
�8

State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351 (Haw. 1933) (holding that eng�!ging

with consenting adults in the privacy of the home is not
th

e constitutional guarantees of privacy).
49

Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986)

a

irr .;e;<.

for hire

fundamental right rrotec:ted by
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strongly suggests that the right to privacy is narrow in applicati o n , with the
private sphere encompassing o n l y traditional heterosexual fami l y values.

The impotence and demise of the Griswold privacy doctrine was even
clearer in Cruzan, in which the state court had begun with the premise that
the right to die was a fundamental one.

I m plicitly eschewing fundamental

rights analysis, the Supreme Court asked o n l y whether Missouri violated
Cruzan's Fourteenth Amendment "liberty interest" when the Missouri
Supreme Court required that C ruzan's parents present "clear and convinc
ing evidence'' of their daughter's wish to terminate life-sustain i n g artificial
nutrition and hydration. The Court's analysis suggests that the right to pri
vacy is weaker i n the contexts to which it is deemed to apply-i . e . , it is a
mere liberty interest, not a fundamental right requiring strict scrutin y .
Dissenting opinions in leadin g abortion cases have challenged both the
right to privacy50 and the notion that abortion rights are among our privacy
rights.51 Maj ority opinions in recent abortion cases now reflect the narrow
ing and weakening of the privacy doctrine.

Health Services, 52

In

Webster v. Reproductive

the Court permitted legislation requiring viability testing

and limits on publicly funded physician care, 53 and the opinion of the Chief
Justice allowed states to assert an interest in the unborn at conception, an
idea a maj ority of the Court now embraces. 54 I n two recent cases involving
teen access to abortion, parental notification statutes containing a j udicial
by-pass provision were upheld . 55 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens, an
abortion "liberal, " applied Justice O ' Connor's weaker "undue burden" test
to rationalize the Court's decision that the Constitution permits states to

treat minors differently from adults with respect to abortion . In R ust v. Sul

livan,

the Court used the line of cases upholding the right of government to

refuse to fund i n d igent women's abortions to uphold the "gag rule," \vhich
prevented physicians in federally funded clinics from discussi n g abortion
w i th their low income patients. 56 Neither privacy nor free speech values pre
vailed on behalf of the abortion right in

R ust. Casey

continues the p rocess of

disregarding the free speech and p rivate choice i m p lications of state abortion
50

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I have difficulty

in concluding . .. that the right of 'privacy' is involved in this case. .. . A transaction
resulting in an operation such as this [i.e. , a medical abortion] is not 'private' in the.:
ordinary usage of rhat
51

word.'').

See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 Li.S.

747, 785-36 (1986) (White, L joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court carries

forward the 'difficult and continuing venture in substantive due process' ... that bc.:gan
with . .

.

Roe

v.

Wade . ..

and has lead the Court further and further af1eld in the thirte:::n

years since the decision was handed down.").
52

53

492 U.S. 490 (1990).

!d.

5'

See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816.

55

Ohio

v.

Akron Ctr. for Rep rod. Health, 497 U.S

sota. 497 U.S 417 (1990).
56

Rust v. Su:Jivan, IllS. Ct. 1759 (1991).

502 ( 1990); Hodgson

v.

l'v1inne
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laws; although it invalidated spousal notification and upheld
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R oe, Casey

also

upheld informed consent provisions that dictated what physicians m ust say
to their patients.

CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIONS
Di rectional metaphors are a useful device for distinguishing among differ
ing approaches to legal interpretation and adj udication . J udges decide cases
from perspectives that are to one degree or another backward-looking, for
ward-looking, upward - looking, downward-looking, and/or i n ward-looking.
In my view, an important explanation for the demise of the fundamental
right to privacy doctrine and the resultant constriction of abortion liberty is
the Court's increasing commitment to backward-looking legal positivism
and downward-looking moral positivism as its interpretive p h ilosophy of
constitutional, including fundamental, rights.
I n adoptin g backward-looking perspectives, j udges rely on established
positive l aw , including statutes, case precedents, constitutions, and interna
tional treaties.

I n deciding a case, the backward-looking approach searches

for the original intent of the framers (originalism, intentionalism) or refer
ences the plain meaning of the text (textualism). J udges with forward-look
ing perspectives reference optimal social or economic policies. A lthough t h e
backward-looking j udge would choose between consequence A and conse
quence B on the basis of e xisting positive legal norms, a forward-lookin g
j udge would feel unconstrained by established Jaw that furthers n o beneficial
interest.

Among the traditional legal philosophies, positivism is the legal

p hilosophy of the backward-looking j udge; realism is the philosophy of the
forward-looking judge.57
Upward - l ooking perspectives base decisions on their conformity to nor
mative ideals. Upward-looking perspectives consider appeals to ideal moral
ity, natural law, or some other rationall y or intuitively ascertainable norms.
Like the forward-looking j ud ge, the upward looker bases decisions on sub
stantive values not necessarily embodied in existing l a w .
upward-looking j udge may n ot hold strictly practical values.

However, the
For example,

the judge may view j ustice as a Kantian , adhering to categorical principles,
would view it. Natural lawy . e rs are upward lookers who believe t hat rules of
reason are a substantive constraint on the law's legitimacy.58
Upward-looking jurisprudence relies upon supposedl y higher ideals.

B:y

contrast, downward-looking jurisprudence appeals to the wishes, opimons.
57

See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW

(1961) (presenting what became an

influential revival and critique of nineteenth century British positivism); Karl N. Llewel
lyn, Some Realism About Rea/ism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HAR V . L. REv 12:?.2
( 1934) (detailing classic realist methods and positions). See generally Felix S. Cohen.
Transcendenwl Nonsense and rhe Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L RE\i. 809 ( 1935)
(describing a realist app roach to jurisprudence).
58

See gqnera/!y JOHN FtNNlS, NATURAL LAW .>.ND N.'\TCRAL RIGHTS

ing rational "natural law·· philosophy).

(1980)

(re·,i\
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and expectations of the community, whether or not they have been enacted
into positive law or they satisfy higher normative p rinciples or practical poli
cies. The actual positive values of the community, or a maj ority within the
community, are the basis of the downward looker's decisions.

Downward

lookers are to positive moral values what backward lookers are to positive
legal values.
Finally, inward-looking perspectives eschew any attempt to ground judg
ment on a non-subj ective or non-intersubj ective foundation. I nward-looking
considerations appeal directly t o subj ectivity, to what the decisionm aker
believes is best, whether or not i t conforms to popular will, ideal norms,
practical policies, or "past political acts." The self-conscious inward looker
may b e a post-modernist who believes that the backward looker's j udgments
about past political acts, the forward looker's social or economic optimums,
t h e upward looker's higher values, and the downward looker's community
values are veiled j udgments about socially constructed personal preferences.
I believe the opinions of modern American j udges reflect all of the direc
tional tendencies identified here. 59 Courts rarely completely ignore t h e for
ward-looking benefits to be gained or the highest ideals of upward-looking
j ustice. However, the Supreme Court has embraced backward-looking posi
tivism as its official legal philosophy .

On the level of rhetoric, backward

looking perspectives dominate the pronouncements o f the S upreme Court.
A s lawyers know, even i n this post-realist, post-modernist world, the perva
sive rhetorical approaches of the Justices of the Court, whether liberal or
conservative, reflect a tendency t o j ustify interpretations and decisions by
considering backward-looking appeals to intent, text, and precedent.

A

favorite ancillary rhetorical approach of the Court is positivistic traditional
ism-the downward-looking appeal to the nation's o r Western worl d ' s nor
mative traditions.

The positivism of Justices Scalia and Thomas, to choose

the Court ' s most conservative members, goes beyond rhetoric to substance.
Positivism is a way of doing as well as speaking.
Based o n the tenor of the Court's opinions, its conception of i ts interpre
tive and decisional role is that of an institution bound to serve the public as
an i ndependent, apolitical branch of governme n t charged with i n terpreting
and applying in a principled manner laws i t did no t author. The legislative
and constitutional will of the sovereign people dictates the substance of j udi
cial decisionmaking-this is the assurance offered by liberal and conse rvati ve
Justices alike.
Fortunately, American law and ethical traditions a ppear to e m b od y m any
good values, sensible policies, and ideals of justice. For this reason, posit i v 
ism in constitutional adjudication is n o t wholly condemnable in practice.
The virtual unity of law and justice renders legal and moral posi tivism's
backward-

and

Court' s resort
59

d ownward-looking
to

directions

p a lat abl e

.

However,

the

backward-looking and downward-looking adjudication

Richard Posner agrees. See RIC H A R D A. PosN E R , THE P R O B L E'\IS o r J U R IS P R U 

D E N C E ( 1 990) (defending a pragmatic, ins trumental conception of l a w a n d adj udicat i o n ) .
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ceases t o be palatable i n t w o problematic situations : when i t seems phony
and when it seems u njust.
Judicial positivism seems phony when the result reached i n a case d o es not
appear to be premised on the positive values stated, so that the C o u r t ' s rhet
oric of positivism appears u n persuasive.

J udicial positivism seems u nj ust

whe n , although i t may succeed as positivistic rhetoric, the resu l t reached i n a
case

seems

to

violate

important

extra-legal

or

non-traditional

norms.

Al though realist and critical legal studies opponents of positivism oppose it
as a comprehensive legal philosophy because i t seems phon y, the proponents
of traditional natural law rej ec t positivism because it seems u nj us t .

Phony

positivism, critics say, conceals the multiplicity of factors involved in decid
ing a case; unj ust positivism, n aturalists say, i mpedes relief for victims of
wrongdoing and progress for victims of oppression and discrimination.

I join other constitutional scholars who detect pern icious forms of positiv
ism in many areas of Supreme Court j urisprudence. 5 ° B oth liberal and con
servative j udges tend to issue opinions that are positivist.

In

Bowers,

for

example, the liberal dissenters relied on two positivistic sources of law: the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the precedent of previous right of
p riv acy cases. 51 Frank Michelman argues that the
"

Bowers

m aj o rity likewise

·N ears its positivistic constitutional theory on its sleev e . ' '62

Putting aside

the re levance of j udgments about whether laws against sodomy between con
senting adults are "wise or desirable , " J ustice White framed the issue in

Bowers

as " whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right

upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. "63 He then looked to the very kind
of bigoted state laws against homosexuality as those under review for norma
t ive guidance on whether the Fourteenth Amendmen t ought to p rotect con
s e nting adult homosexuals.
\Vhy is the right to privacy unpopular with the current Court?

Some

un popularity may have to do with the kinds of controversial behavior-such
as hom osexuality and abortion-that are protected under the right of p ri

vacy rubric. J u dicial critics publicly oppose the doc t rine o n other grounds,
chiefly the bacbvard-looking positivist ground that the right to p rivacy is
n o t a textually based or enumerated right, b u t an undemocratic invemion.

Jus tice Scalia, for example, attacked the abortion pnvacy doctrine in his
60

Silas .J . Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seid man , The Fo u n h A m endmcn r

os

Consritu

rionai Th eory , 7 7 G EO. L . J . 1 9. 6 7 - 6 8 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ( ' 'Si nce the d e m i s e o f Lochner

v.

Ne\v

Y o r k [ , 1 9 8 U . S . 45 ( 1 905),] and the discred i t i ng of the n a t u ra l law ideology t h a t S il p 
po rted it, pos itivism has p l a y e d a dominant r o l e i n cert a i n corners o f c o n s t i tu t ional t he
ory [i ncludmg chal lenges t o social and economic legi s l a t i o n on equal protec t i o n g ro u n d s .
judicial enforcement of d u e process, and t h e contracts and takings c lausesl " ) .
61

Bo wers, 47 8 U . S . a t 1 9 9-2 1 4 ( B lackm u n , J . ,

joi ned

bv Brennan. Mars h a l l . & S kvens.

J L d i ssen t i ng).
62

63

Frank M ichelman. L a w 's R ep u b!ic , 97 Y A L E LJ. 1 49 3 . 1 49 7 (

1 988).

Bowers. 478 U . S . a t 1 90.
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dissent because of what he called "two simple facts. " 64

695
They were

that "( 1 ) the Constitution says absol utely nothing about [abortion] , and

(2)

the longstanding tradi tions of A merican society have permitted [abortion] t o
be legally proscribed. "65 Similarly, scholarly critics maintain that the fram
ers did not enumerate a right to privacy for a good reason: it is too broad
and vague to function as a constitutional principle.

Moreover, by virtue of

its breadth and vagueness, the right to privacy grants the federal j u d iciary
powers that approach those of the legislature, which powers properly belong
to Congress and state lawmakers.
Justice Scalia adheres to what Professor Mark Tushnet labels "in terpretiv
ism. "66 Interpretivism holds that j udges should l i m i t themselves to norms
that are stated or clearly implied in the written Constitution and to the fram
ers' normative intent.

According to Tushnet, textualism, intentionalism,

originalism, and other forms of interpretivism have popular appeal .

They

appeal to many who believe that they respond to the problem "that j udges
no less than legislators were political actors, motivated primari ly by their
own interests and values. "67 Tush net contrasts interpretivism with another
liberal ideology of which he is equally critical: "neutral principles . " Neutral
principles maintains that j udicial process must be based on general i mpartial
neutral principles. Although textualist interpretivists view the written docu
ment as a non-arbitrary foundation for legal reasoning, neutral principles
theorists view their own rationally derived principles as fou n dations.

Casey

pitted Justice Scalia's interpretivism against the model of neutral

principles followed by Justices O ' Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.

Justice

Scalia's "two simple facts"68 reflect his positivistic interpretivism . The mod
erate Justices' joint opinion is a paradigm of neutral principalism, upward
looking to right reason, but j ustified by appeal to the backward-looking
norm of legal tradition :
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process
c laims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exer
cise the same capacity which courts have always exercis e d : reasoned
j udgment.

Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression in a simple

rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices
with which w e disagree; yet neither does it permit us to shrink from the
9
duties of our office.
6

04

55
66

Casey,

1 1 2 S. Ct. at 2 874.

!d.

Mark V. Tushnet, Fo llowing the R u les Laid Down: A Critique of Interprelivism and

.Yeu 1ral Prin ciples, 9 6 H A R V . L . REV. 7 8 1 ( 1 983) (deta i l i ng and critiquing interpret i v i srn

and neu t ral principles, t wo leading t h eories of modern con s t i t u t ional Jaw tha t atte m p t to
limit j udicial discretion).
6'

GS
69

!d . at 7 8 4.

Sec supra text accompanying note 64.
Casey , 1 1 2 S. C t . at 2 806.
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. T h e Court must take care t o speak and act i n w ay s that allow
people to accept its decision on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle . . . . 70
I would criticize the Court for attempting to elevate reason to a level of
obj ectivity and neutrality beyond its fallibly human scale, but praise it for
refusing to limit constitutional i n terpretation to text and t raditi o n . Yet, the
maj o rity in

Casey

engaged i n a good deal of backward-looking argumenta

tion, insisting on stare decisis on behalf of

Roe

and reaffirm ing

R oe

by

appealing to the cases that support it. The maj o rity opinion, which appears
to be an attempt to strike a workable compromise between the political
extremes of the pro-choice and pro-life positions, is weak in its downward
focused re-reading of
The

Casey

R oe.

m ajority does not di rectly address the familiar arguments for

narrowly limiting interpretation to text and tradition. Briefly, the arguments
i n favor of i nterpretivism are that it is democratic, objective, and s afe, and it
is a t least safer for oppressed minorities than the alternative of u nrestrained
j udicial l aw-making.

Counter-arguments include

(1)

that originalism must

be rejected because it mandates doing injustice if the law is u njust;
interpretivism is impossible, and therefore ill usory or phony;71

(2)
(3)

t hat
that

attempts to discover what the framers intended will lead to ambiguous and
indeterminate results;

(4)

that o u r efforts to look backward are l imited by

our own normative horizons; and

(5)

that originalism ' s m aj o ri tarian and

democratic pretensions are just that: pretensions.
I view philosophical arguments against interpretivism as m o re compelling
than the arguments for it.

Unjust old l aw and its interpretation should

not-and cannot-govern new times. Neither backward- looking o ri ginalism
and textualism nor downward-looking t raditionalism can survive the obser
vation that d ramatic changes have occurred since the Constitution was
enacted . The Constitution is an imperfect eighteenth century document.

It

i s imperfect because the n o torious Three-fifths Compromise marred i t .
Niore gen erally, it is imperfect because i t has failed to protect fu l l y African
Americans, Native Am ericans, white women, and poor people.

Even after

the addition of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution remained i m perfect.

It

took the post-Civil War Amendments to deconstitution alize involuntary ser
vitude, the disenfranchisement of women, and the poll tax.

I can offer no full-fl edged alternative to interpretivism i n t h e p lace of
backward-looking and downward-looking positivism. One has to be w i l l i n g
to c a l l a rotten egg rotten, however, even i f there is nothing e l s e to e a t .

For

t u nately , th ere is a bit of bread in the cupboard once textualism and original
ism are rejected.

I believe that, at a minimum, courts should seek to b ring

about their own substantive j ustice, unfettered , if the occasion demands, by
failed efforts of previ ous generations to do t h e same.

The great practical

70 !d. a t 2814.
71

See supra t e x t accompan ying n o t e s 5 9 - 60.
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v a l u e of the American Constitution is t h a t i t s i nspirational general language
allows, invites, and requires hard j udicial thinking about the ideal terms and
conditions of social and economic life.
Legal theorists often debate whether courts should limit their vision to
established law and traditio n .

Theorists, however, seldom voice a related

and equally important concern: prospective positivism. The problem of pro
spective positivism exists because human beings "make" as well as " inter
pret" law, and because the reasonability of positivist expectations at the
moment of legislation is as questionable as the reasonability of these expecta
tions at the moment of adj udication.

Can l egislators reasonably expect

fu ture generations to yield to their expressions of legislative will?

The case

for i nterpretivism is weakened to the extent that one cannot reasonab l y
expect one' s w i l l to be d o n e indefinitely i n t o the future. T h e concern I a m
raising c a n be illuminated by an analogy.
The famous British utilitarian legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham wanted
to retain influence over his fol l owers after his death. At his request when he
died, his remains were dissected and preserved.

Dressed in his clothes and

seated in a chair, his preserved body was p l aced in a glass display case as an
auto-icon.72 When Bentham's actual head became unattractively desiccated ,

i t was removed, placed a t his feet, a n d replaced with a w a x l i keness.
Bentham thought physical preservation would ensure the longevity of his
philosophic influence more effectively than his many books and articles.
Yet, i t is unlikely that the utilitarian sect o r the board of the University of

London

was especially faith ful to Bentham's wishes. The expectation of one

generation that its law w i l l continue to have the same meanin g for the next

generation

is as vain as B entham ' s pathetic expectation.

For

law to stick, it

must appear to conform to the perceived i nterests and values of succeeding
generations.
The

American

Constitution

is

d u rable

the appearance-of-conformity requi rement .

precisely

because

meets

Constitutional i nterpretations

change because of the rhetorical and practical failures of judges
future wants and values.

it

to

predict

It was more i mportant to Bentham's survivors to

h ave an attractive head on his auto-icon, than Bentham's actual head.

It

may be more important to the American people to have a Fourtee n t h
Amendment t h a t protects women a s equals, t h a n t o have an Amend ment
that

conforms to

authentic nineteenth century expecrations.

CONCL USION
A b o rtion j urisprudence demonstrates

i nterpretation is

that,

in

practice,

cons t i t u t ional
S t a re deci-

neither especially precise n o r especially binding.

7 2 See Ross H ARRISON, B E N T H A M 22-23 ( 19 8 3 ) (describing h ow ideas a b o u t · · use o f
l h e dead to the living" and ' "representation" c reated Bent h a m ' s des i re to b e d i ssected and

t u rned i n to an icon-relic for his eponymous u t i l i t arian sect ) . Notabl y , Ben t h a m ' s a u t o
ICOn was produced at gat heri n gs of Benthamites for 150 years. !d.
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sis is not an " inexorable"73 principle. Egregious judicial errors m ust be cor
rected; outdated, unworkable policies replaced; and s ubstantive i nj ustice
cured.

To put it so starkly i s to suggest a kind of instability i n Supreme

Court practice. Yet, overall , the practice o f the C o u rt does not seem unsta
ble. This may be because changes in given interpretations o f text typically
fol low changes in social life that mandate new doctri n e . The Supreme Court
survived

Casey because it offered something to those w h o fav o r women's
and to those who favor fetal protectio n . The next doctrinal shift may
the overturning of R oe . However, the popular s u pport for such a d ra

righ ts
be

matic departure from existing law i s doubtful, and t h erefore the public reac
tion to it is potentially explosive.

----------·--- ---- ---

73

C:sey . 1 1 2 S . C t . at 2808.

